Army Transformation to fight Terrorism

The Army has long given serious thought to terrorism, what is it, why is it effective, and how to fight it. Though it didn't really gain the coinage as terrorism (rival terms are more common at other times) until recent decades, low intensity warfare as been a constant concern for thinkers in the Army and Marines. While the Small Wars Manual and the weight of history certainly favor the Marines in devising ways to fight Terrorism and Guerilla wars, the Army has simply the bulk of resources in the form of war colleges to devote to this form of land warfare, and its done somewhat more thinking on the nature of Terrorism. The Army's failure to keep pace with the Marines in implementation of these ideas is based on the Marines superior experience and the Army's otherwise laudable focus on the main threat facing American security, a major land war with the Soviets. One need look no farther than Vietnam to see how this has left the Marines in a much, much better place to run that war. Still the Army had people who understood how to fight that war, mostly in their war colleges and in various special forces units.

The problem facing the Army is how to transform itself from a main battle force designed to confront a superpower in Central Europe, to one capable of fighting the War on Terror and otherwise specializing in fighting low intensity wars. This problem is what makes Rumsfeld the essential man at the Pentagon. My fear is that there is no one else with the combination of the right vision and the ability to compel the military establishment as Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense web site starts off with a link on the War on Terror, but right after that is a link called "Transformation." That strikes me about right.

Westmoreland and Abrams were good soldiers who both fought as armored commanders in World War II. Had a war in Central Europe occured, they would have commanded armored divsions and mechanized corps with skill and great ability. That they were called upon to command in Vietnam is the mistake of others. Senior officers generally seek to fight the last war, to make the best of lessons learned, and avoid taking risks with radically new ideas or technology. Even some young officers I have spoken with have warned against too much transformation, and would prefer to leave the army a heavy main battle force. Before World War II theorists could be found advocating a radical new kind of war that would make the trench obsolete. Some spoke of the stormtrooper tactics, others of machine guns, still others of high level bombers, and yet others of tanks, submarines, or missiles. None were entirely wrong, but those advocated for tanks were more right than most. Combining tanks, close support aircraft, and mobile infantry to encircle enemy formations wasn't nearly as obvious in 1936 as it was in 1946. Doing it effectively was the trick.

The War on Terror will require some new vision, new tactics, applying and summoning forth new technology, and will draw on some experiences of military history (other low intensity wars) while drawing only most generally on the whole of military history. Kursk 1943 is not the place to start. The Philippines 1903 would be a far more reasonable place. This won't happen by itself. Compelling the old soldiers to abandon learned lessons will be hard, embracing a new doctrine will produce anxiety, advocates of alternative doctrines will snipe, changes will harm old constituencies before new ones are built to defend the new way.

Some of these new things may require a larger role for special forces, and so they may need to expand, but I think the bulk of the changes will involve using the familiar rifleman in new ways and under new conditions. For example, the support of precision guided weapons is probabaly as profound as the development of close air support was sixty plus years ago. Utilizing new communications and computer speeds will make new kinds of actions possible. I suspect the new kind of war won't look radically different: we won't abandon armor or shift way over to special forces. Nor will we need the Crusader, new heavy tanks, or other slow, heavy machines.

After Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Army moves forward, it needs to study the lessons of these campaigns and conciously look back to the campaigns of its own, and especially the Marines' small wars experience. In the meantime, as the Army moves forward with its transformation, don't kill the old doctrines, just shelve them. Thinkers in the war colleges will be anticipating the kinds of wars new enemies might require. Who these new enemies are or what kind of wars they will fight remains a mystery. Like the planners of the 1920's and 1930's who contemplated wars against all the major powers, a variety of ideas were developed and ultimatly found their way into the final war plans of World War II.